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Sergey BLINOV1 
Negative Consequences of Smooth 
Devaluation 
In 2015, many countries had to deal with the weakening of their currencies. Issues 
regarding exchange rate management by the Central Banks have again become the 
focal point of heated debate. This article compares two approaches to devaluation 
of local currency under the pressure of external circumstances: smooth 
devaluation and swift or instantaneous devaluation (drastic, stepped-up). 
Negative consequences of the «smooth» weakening of the exchange rate are 
shown, including the example of George Soros' famous attack on the British pound 
in 1992. Using «only» £5 bn. then, Soros managed to break the resistance of the 
Bank of England, which ended up investing £15 bn. to fight him. 
The ideas of Robert Shiller, the Nobel Laureate, have been reviewed which allow 
this phenomenon to be explained. Recommendations are given regarding a more 
rational way of managing exchange rate using the example of actions taken by the 
Bank of Kazakhstan in February 2014. 
Key words: Monetary Policy, Central Banking, Business Cycles, International 
Finance, Foreign Exchange; 
JEL classification: E30, E52, E58, E65, F30, F31,  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
It is not the first time that Russia is confronted with a sweeping attack on the Ruble. 
The same thing happened back in 2008. Still greater pressure was brought to bear 
on the Ruble in 2014. The crux of the matter is that the Central Bank of Russia in all 
these episodes made the same mistake dubbed «smooth» devaluation. 
In order to get a better understanding of the problem, one needs to refer to certain 
rules, which apply to setting prices. The experience of industrial companies would 
help us in this respect. Among other things, thanks to this experience, we will 
understand why George Soros’ famous attack on the British pound in 1992 
succeeded, why the pressure brought to bear on the Ruble in 2014 turned out to 
be so powerful and what the Nobel laureate Robert Shiller has to do with it. 
3 THEY WILL NEVER LEARN 
In 2008 and in 2014, the Ruble exchange rate was under a very strong pressure. In 
2008, the exchange rate did not change on such a huge scale (from 23 to 36 Rubles 
per dollar, a change of 56%), and, at the same time, the Central Bank of Russia 
spent by far more foreign exchange on currency interventions, more than 200 bn. 
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USdollars, having bought out in the market more than 5.5 trillion Rubles in order to 
preclude the weakening of the Ruble. 
During 2014, the scale of the Central Bank’s operations was somewhat less 
spectacular, the Bank spent more than 70 billion USdollars’ worth of foreign 
exchange in order to purchase on the order of 3.5 trillion Rubles. While, at the same 
time, the fluctuation in the Ruble exchange rate, at certain moments, reached 
100% even at the «conservative» official exchange rate. From the level of 33.6 
Rubles to the USdollar at the end of June 2014, the Ruble exchange rate fell down 
to 67.8 Rubles to the USdollar in December 2014. 
The fact that the Ruble had been falling in synch with the other currencies of the 
emerging market countries was small consolation, as, in terms of the scale of such 
depreciation, at a certain moment, (even it was a temporary event) the Ruble broke 
the world record, having outstripped the Ukrainian grivna. What is the cause of 
these recurring situations? From further narrative below it clearly follows that the 
cause of all this is the «smooth» devaluation (which is also sometimes referred to 
as «velvet devaluation»). And Russia, as somebody who will never learn, did that a 
second time, with no object lessons having been drawn from the country’s past. 
4 FOUR SCENARIOS OF THE PRICE TREND DEVELOPMENT AND THE MARKET 
RESPONSE 
To get at the bottom of the causes of what has been happening, we will resort to 
marketing, namely a section of marketing which deals with pricing. The economic 
theory says that when the prices for goods go up, demand goes down (the so-called 
law of demand). However, marketing (and the economic theory, for that matter) 
describe such a situation where a price rise for a good boosts sales. And this is 
accounted for, in certain cases, by the fact that the buyer perceives the price rises 
to be evidence of the goods high quality or a message signaling that this good is in 
demand. And he or she buys this good «before the prices have shot up», even if 
earlier they had not planned to do that. So where does the truth is? Is the economic 
theory or marketing right? 
Let us examine an example from real practice. The Russian truck producer (the 
company КАМАZ) in early 2011 – in late 2012 sharply jacked up the prices for its 
core product in the segment of heavy duty dump trucks, the «КАМАZ-6520» dump 
truck. The spikes in costs were responsible for the price increases, while demand 
seemed to be no problem. Such an analysis proved to be a mistake (Blinov 2015a). 
Sales dramatically declined, and based on the year 2012 performance results, 
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КАМАZ ended up having a lower market share in the segment of heavy duty dump 
trucks which fell down from 44% to 27% compared to 2011. At the same time, 
gradual increase in the prices for other models caused demand for them to grow. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this case is simple enough: key to everything and 
decisive is often the nature of price increases, whether such price increases are 
smooth or sharp.  
Let us look at smooth and sharp changes both for the case of price increases and 
price reductions. 
4.1 SMOOTH PRICE INCREASE 
A smooth price increase, as a rule, enhances the desire to purchase a good (and 
generally, any asset). 
The case of smooth price increase is schematically depicted in graph 1. 
Graph 1. Smooth price increase encourages an ever-growing number of buyers to 
acquire the goods as soon as possible. 
 
The thoughts of a potential buyer in this case are approximately along the following 
lines: «The goods are in demand and worth buying as soon as possible before they 
become too expensive» 
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If such a situation happens in the assets market (for example, shares), it is also 
important to understand the thought of potential sellers, i.e. those who are holding 
this asset. They, in the case under consideration, are as follows: «My asset is getting 
more expensive. It was good I bought it earlier. It does not make sense to sell it 
now, I will wait for the price to rise further». The number of buyers is getting 
greater, the number of sellers is getting still smaller, which pushes the prices 
further up. 
«The price will continue to rise!» - such is the general mood of the market. 
4.2 SHARP PRICE INCREASE 
If the price increase was sharp, that may reduce demand very considerably (graph 
2). 
Graph 2. Sharp price increase reduces purchase volumes, especially if the prices 
freeze after that. 
 
After the price shoots up, purchase volumes decrease sharply. The buyer’s 
thoughts are approximately like this: «I have not managed to buy it on time. The 
prices will now keep falling down (alternative: will not rise), there is no need to rush 
with the purchase». This is exactly the kind of a situation that happened in the case 
described above where the company KAMAZ sharply raised the prices for its dump 
trucks. 
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The sellers, on the contrary, think that they will now have a big break and it is the 
right time to sell the asset, before the prices fall down. The reduction in the number 
of buyers and the increase in the number of sellers push prices down. 
«The price will keep falling down (or it will not be going up)» - such is the general 
mood of the market. 
4.3 SMOOTH PRICE REDUCTION 
In the case of smooth price reduction, the buyers are thinning out (graph 3) 
Graph 3. Smooth price reduction results in reduced number of purchases. 
 
One can relate to the thoughts of potential buyers: why rush if the prices are going 
down. While those who hold such an asset, are thinking, that the asset needs 
getting rid of before the prices fall still further down. 
As a result, there are too many sellers and too few buyers in the market and that 
pushes the prices further down. 
«Prices will continue to go down» - such is the market’s expectation. 
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4.4 SHARP PRICE DROP 
A sharp drop in prices attracts buyers (graph 4) 
Graph 4. After a sharp drop in prices the number of purchases increases 
 
Potential buyers believe that they need to take advantage of the moment while the 
prices are still low. Whereas those who are holding the asset are probably thinking 
along the following lines: «I missed the right time to sell. Maybe, it is best to wait 
this period out until the prices rise rather than sell at a loss». Both buyers and 
sellers expect the prices to rise. 
There are more buyers than sellers and that pushes the prices up. 
«The prices will be rising» - such is the expectation of the market players. 
4.5 KEY FINDINGS 
Based on the scenarios just considered, several findings can be listed below: 
1. Buyers’ behavior and sellers’ behavior are predicated by the expected price 
trend development. 
2. This expected trend development becomes a «self-materializing» forecast. 
3. Manufacturer (seller), interested in sales growth, if possible, would be 
advised to stick to the following rule: «Raise the prices slowly and reduce 
them quickly». 
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Dynamic pricing rule: 
«Raise the prices slowly, reduce them quickly» 
 
Marketing knows of exceptions to this rule. For example, if it is required to change 
the goods positioning in the buyers’ eyes (to make it be perceived to be prestigious, 
for instance), the manufacturer may take a different course of action. 
Let me refer to another exception. The stock exchange players (speculators) know 
that an attempt to buy a sharply depreciating asset can be likened to «an attempt 
to catch a falling knife». That means that the prices for the asset may continue to 
fall down even further. Peter Lynch (2011) writes that «an attempt to catch the 
bottom of a falling share is akin to an attempt to catch a falling knife – you invariably 
grab it at the inopportune moment».  
Despite the above exceptions, the general “laws” of price dynamics, described 
above, operate exceptionally well which can be proven to one’s satisfaction using 
specific examples. This is exactly what we will do now. 
5 CASE 1. SOROS’ ATTACK ON THE BRITISH POUND IN 1992 
During 1992, George Soros, the American financier, then hardly known to the 
general public, engaged in a speculative game aimed at weakening the British 
pound sterling. As a result of his actions, the exchange rate of the pound 
precipitously tumbled, and Soros, according to various estimates, earned between 
one and two billion US dollars on this transaction. 
Simplified scheme2 of Soros’ actions was as follows: 
 By pledging the US dollars that he had, he borrowed, on credit, British 
pounds sterling in the amount of about BPS 5 bn.  
 These pounds were offered for sale (they were used to buy German marks), 
which caused the pound exchange rate to plunge vis-à-vis the mark (and, as 
a consequence, in relation to other currencies as well). 
 The Bank of England tried to resist the plunging pound, having bought out 
BPS 15 bn.  in the course of its interventions (spending gold and foreign 
exchange reserves on such interventions). This did not help and on 
September 16-th 1992, the Bank of England announced the end of its 
interventions. The pound exchange rate collapsed. 
                                                          
2 Simplification consists in the fact that in the transactions it is not only the currencies themselves that were used 
but also assets (shares, bonds) and derivative financial instruments (futures and options)  denominated in these 
currencies were used. For purposes of our exposition, this does not matter and does not change the final findings. 
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 After collapse of the pound, repayment of the credit facility (in pounds) cost 
Soros 1 billion (according to other theories, 2 billion) cheaper in the US dollar 
equivalent. That was his gain generated by this speculative attack. 
Please pay attention to the amounts highlighted in bold font. The key question for 
us is as follows: how could Soros with a capital of approximately 5 billion pounds 
sterling have stood up to the interventions of the Bank of England worth 15 billion 
pounds and win in the process? 
The answer is to be found in the «laws» of pricing dynamics which we have laid 
down above, they are also the laws of asset attractiveness:  
 The German mark had been smoothly appreciating in price in the meantime 
and the number of buyers (apart from Soros) had been getting greater and 
greater. Whereas the number of owners holding the German mark willing to 
sell it (those were the «allies» of the Bank of England), had been becoming 
fewer and fewer. 
 The British pound had been slowly losing value and those wishing to sell it 
had been becoming more numerous. Moreover, vice versa, the number of 
those desirous to buy the pound had been becoming fewer and fewer (why 
buy now if tomorrow you can buy it cheaper). 
 George Soros proved to be the one who gave the initial impetus to the 
«smooth» trend development of the exchange rate, having infected 
everyone around him with the «virus» to sell the pound. «Soros was not the 
only one: many investors followed his example and sold the pounds off, 
exerting a huge pressure on the exchange rate of this currency» (Lien, 
2013).  
Soros’  operation is vividly illustrated in graph 5. 
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Graph 5. «Smooth» devaluation of the pound by the Bank of England enabled Soros 
to involve an enormous number of followers into the operations against the pound 
 
Source of the diagram: Lien (2013); the author’s commentary. Note: downward 
movement of the graph means the weakening of the pound sterling in relation to 
the German mark. 
The «laws» of pricing dynamics set forth above account well for what happened.  
 The German mark was perceived to be a smoothly appreciating asset (ref. 
graph 1). The number of buyers of the mark was rapidly increasing, while the 
number of those who wished to sell it was becoming less and less, which 
further contributed to the strength of the mark.  
 The British pound was perceived to be a smoothly depreciating asset (ref. 
graph 3). The number of sellers of the pound had been growing fast while 
those who were willing to buy it had been becoming less and less, which 
further affected the fall of the pound exchange rate. 
A discerning reader will have noticed by now the analogy with the Russian Ruble 
situation in 2014. We are now proceeding to review this matter below. 
GBP/DEM exchange rate 
as a result of Soros’ currency operations
As a result, the 
pound exchange 
rate precipitously  
collapsed 
Smooth («velvet») devaluation of the Pound
between May and September 1992 helped
Soros embroil a huge number of players into 
speculations against the British currency 
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6 ROBERT SHILLER ABOUT PRICE BUBBLES 
The behavior pattern, which we described in our «laws of pricing dynamics», is very 
well known. Even Nobel prizes are awarded for this. 
Thus, for example, the Nobel Prize for economics in 2013 was awarded to three 
economists, one of whom was Robert Shiller, Professor of Yale University (the 
other two were: Eugene F. Fama and Lars Peter Hansen). The prize was awarded 
for «empirical analysis of prices for assets». 
Here is what the «Vedomosti» newspaper writes about it (Overchenko, 2013): 
«Shiller could be considered to be the most famous in the broad economic circles 
from today’s prize winners. He has been active in studying dependency between 
the price of assets on people’s psychology, in co-authorship with the Nobel Prize 
laureate George Akerlof, he wrote, incidentally, the book «Animal Spirits: How 
Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global 
Capitalism», where he spoke about the special features of human behavior, which 
had a bearing on microeconomic processes. Shiller can be deemed to be the author 
of the definition of the «market bubble» — i.e. «a temporary rise in prices for 
assets which, to greater extent, is explained by the investors’ enthusiasm than by 
real, fundamental assessment of their real value» 
«That the bubble will emerge is impossible to foretell. I am inclined to consider 
them to be social epidemics: they transmit from one human to another 
approximately the same way as regular infections. The bubble starts to take shape 
when the level of contagion of the ideas, which shape it, grows. However the level 
of contagion depends on the thought models and psychological mind set which is 
a subject that is very difficult to judge about», — he writes. While we shall add to 
the above that it also depends on the smoothness of the price rise for the 
«contagious asset». 
In his article in another item in the «Vedomosti» newspaper Shiller (2013) writes: 
«In the second edition of my book «Irrational Euphoria» I tried to give a better 
definition of the bubble. «The price bubble, — I wrote then, — is a situation when 
the news of rising prices stimulates the investor’s activity and this enthusiasm is 
spread by way of, as it were, epidemic, psychosis passed from one human to 
another, in parallel multiplying explanations of such a price rise… This attracts an 
ever increasing number of investors despite doubts about the real value of 
investments, attracted partly by jealousy of success achieved by others and partly 
by the zeal of a gambler».  
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It is easy to imagine specific examples of such a price rise rather than the abstract 
«price rise», mentioned in this quotation. Just picture to yourself that we are 
talking about, for example, the price of the German mark during the time of Soros’ 
attack on the British pound. Or about the US dollar during the time of the attack on 
the Russian ruble in 2014.  
Shiller is talking more about price rises for assets rather than price decline. 
However, above we have also dealt with the impact of a price decline on the 
buyers’ and sellers’ behavior. 
To those who are interested to read more on the subject, in an exciting and easy to 
understand presentation, I would recommend the book by Elena Chirkova, the 
author of «Anatomy of a Financial Bubble» (Chirkova, 2010), which abounds in 
multiple interesting examples from literature. 
It was exactly the behavior pattern described by Shiller that helped George Soros 
bring the British pound down. 
7 CASE 2. BANK OF RUSSIA, IN 2014, MADE THE SAME MISTAKE AS THE 
BANK OF ENGLAND MADE IN 1992 
In 2014, the situation in the foreign exchange market was unfolding for the Ruble 
very much the same way as it had happened to the pound in the far-off year 1992. 
First off, the Ruble, for several successive months, had been gradually devaluing 
(from June to November). Then, in December 2014, there happened a precipitous 
collapse of the ruble exchange rate (graph 6).  
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Graph 6. Smooth Devaluation of the Ruble Embroiled an Ever Increasing Number 
of Players Against It in 2014. 
 
Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation, official exchange rate (Rubles per 
one dollar). Note: movement of the graph upwards stands for the weakening of the 
Ruble against the US dollar. 
Now many people are trying to get their heads around the cause of such a 
precipitous collapse. However, to those readers who have read the basics of the 
«theory of pricing dynamics» set forth above and who know the reasons why 
George Soros succeeded in his attack on the British pound, one of the reasons is 
crystal clear. This is the involvement of an ever increasing number of players into 
the game against the Ruble due to the «smoothness» of devaluation. 
Here is what, in December 2014, Sergey Alexashenko (2014) wrote about this 
situation: «However, it is those who have today given in to panic that are 
determining what has been happening to the Ruble. Someone, while furious with 
oneself for not having bought the dollar for 40-50-60 Rbls, goes out to buy it at 70. 
Someone else, while blaming oneself for having sold the dollar at 40-50-60, has 
sworn not to sell it if it is less than 100. As a result, the Ruble is roller coasting down 
a steep incline and it is not clear where it will have a rally and when» 
Involvement of an ever-increasing number of people can be seen with a naked eye. 
Even Elvira Nabiullina, Head of the Bank of Russia, in her interview for «Russia 24» 
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TV channel, on November 10-th 2014, said: «On the expectations of the weakening 
exchange rate (of the Ruble) drawn into this game, unfortunately, is everyone, 
including the general public, - explained the Head of the Bank of Russia. – This 
involves both banks and companies. Exporters may delay sale of foreign exchange 
earnings, while importers may buy foreign exchange to set it aside, because they 
need to pay for contracts. This kind of behavior stems from the constant 
expectation of the weakening exchange rate». 
There is only one thing that Elvira Nabiullina cannot second guess: these 
expectations that the Ruble exchange rate may fall down are of the making of the 
Central Bank itself under her leadership. The main reason being the «smoothness» 
of the exchange rate weakening, which draws more and more players into sales of 
the Ruble. Moreover, the number of those wishing to sell their dollars is getting 
fewer and fewer and far between in this case. This is all as simple as the «ABC». 
It is small consolation for Elvira Nabiullina but an additionally alarming 
circumstance for the whole of Russia is the fact that this is happening a second 
time. Precisely the same kind of situation happened back in 2008 (graph 7). 
Graph 7. In 2008, the situation followed absolutely the same scenario as in 2014. 
 
Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation, official exchange rate (Rubles per 
dollar). Note: movement of the graph upwards stands for the weakening of the 
Ruble against the US dollar. 
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Whilst for Elvira Nabiullina, a repeat of the year 2008 situation may serve as some 
kind of rationale («I was not the only one who did it»), for the Central Bank, as the 
institute, and for economic authorities at large, this is a very alarming signal. Since, 
making the same mistake twice may mean one of the two things: either the 
system’s so-called «engineering memory» does not work, when unsuccessful 
practices are rejected and never repeated. Or, (which is also possible), no correct 
conclusions were drawn from the year 2008 mistakes. While the conclusion which 
has been confirmed by two unsuccessful practices (2008 and 2014) is only one: 
smooth devaluation is a very unfortunate solution for the stability of the foreign 
exchange rate (whereas the Central Bank, under the law, shall be responsible for 
such stability). 
8 WHAT IS THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 
Analysis of the causes that brought about the setbacks in the foreign exchange rate 
policy steered by the Central Bank is an interesting and useful thing to make. 
However, there always arises the same question: what is the right thing to do? 
What would have been the right course of action for the Central Bank to follow? In 
this respect, fortunately, we do not have to look far and wide for such experience. 
Our immediate neighbor, Kazakhstan, may serve as a remarkable example. 
8.1 SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE OF DEVALUATION – KAZAKHSTAN IN 2014 
The Central Bank of Kazakhstan, unlike the Central Bank of Russia, during the spring 
of 2014, structured its foreign exchange rate course more professionally. As early 
as March 2014, when the pressure on the gold and foreign exchange reserves of 
Kazakhstan was building up, the Central Bank stopped defending the tenge 
(Kazakhstan’s official currency) exchange rate at the level of 156 tenges to the 
dollar. It passed over to «well prepared defense positions» at the level of 186 
tenges to the dollar. 
As a result, devaluation proved to be abrupt rather than smooth. That was exactly 
why «broad popular masses», like in Russia, did not get involved into the act. This 
made things easier for the Central Bank of Kazakhstan to stabilize the exchange 
rate, to conserve the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves. 
The tenge exchange rate to the dollar, for 10 months, after abrupt devaluation, 
remained stable and even strengthened slightly (graph 8). This is an absolute proof 
of our «theory of pricing dynamics». The shape of graph 8 is a replica of the case of 
the rapid price increase (ref. graph 2 and the commentary to it), where the dollar 
is acting as the sharply appreciated asset. The dollar began to devalue smoothly 
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and this motivated its further sales by the holders of foreign exchange. The tenge 
exchange rate started to be supported by the market. 
Graph 8. The tenge exchange rate to the dollar, after «one-off» devaluation, in 
February 2014, continued to be stable for a long time, strengthening slightly. 
 
Source: www.finam.ru 
As a result, Kazakhstan at the end of 2014 was faced with quite a different set of 
problems. It was preoccupied with the tenge’s excessive strengthening including in 
relation to the sinking Ruble rather than its weakening. 
An interesting question comes up: in Kazakhstan there has been a sharp jump at 
the initiative of the Central Bank of Kazakhstan, whereas in Russia such a leap 
occurred after a period of smooth weakening. What is the difference? Isn’t the 
ultimate result the same, as it may seem at first sight – both here and there was a 
sharp surge in the exchange rate? 
As a matter of fact, there are two key differences. We will be able to see the first 
one, if we try to compare the magnitude of exchange rate fluctuations in 
Kazakhstan and Russia: these differences are just enormous (graph 9). 
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Graph 9. Stepped-up devaluation in Kazakhstan allowed great exchange rate 
variations to be avoided. In Russia, due to erroneous «smooth» devaluation, there 
happened a run on the foreign exchange in the foreign exchange market and at 
certain moments, the Ruble was twice weaker than its exchange rate a year before. 
 
Source: Finam, author’s calculations. 
The second important difference is the spending of gold and foreign exchange 
reserves. Kazakhstan managed without spending gold and foreign exchange 
reserves thanks to one-off devaluation. The Russian Central Bank had to spend 
dozens of billions of dollars on interventions to stabilize the Ruble exchange rate 
(which did not succeed). 
Besides, spending gold and foreign exchange reserves are not just dangerous by 
itself, they are detrimental also because in the process of foreign exchange 
interventions the Ruble money supply contracts (as withdrawn by the Central 
Bank), and this is exactly what leads to a crisis in the economy (Blinov, 2015c). 
 
9 CONCLUSION 
It is entirely possible that underlying the above described behavior are some in-
depth, general principles which even influence animals’ behavior. If a group of 
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predators (for example, wolves, hyenas) sense that resistance put up by their 
victims gets weaker, they step up their attack. The same thing is likely to happen in 
social life, too. Gradual and continuous concessions made, for example, to 
terrorists, only make their appetites bigger and, as it were, bear out the opposing 
side’s weakness. 
It would be very useful for the Central Bank of Russia to record in large letters into 
its «engineering memory» all the downsides of the «smooth» devaluation and 
learn the hard way once and for ever to avoid making the same mistake twice. 
The dilemma of «smooth or abrupt» devaluation is not the only issue of the well 
thought-out foreign exchange rate policy. However, this is the subject matter of 
more articles to come. 
10 REFERENCES 
Aleksashenko, Sergey (2014) «Russian Central Bank: Don’t Shoot at the Piano 
Player», Forbes.ru, 17.12.2014. http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-
column/gosplan/275961-rossiiskii-tsb-ne-strelyaite-v-pianista (in Russian) 
Blinov, Sergey (2015a) «The Rake of Smooth Devaluation». 03.01.2015, Expert.ru, 
http://expert.ru/2015/01/3/grabli-plavnoj-devalvatsii/ (in Russian). 
Blinov, Sergey (2015b) «Secrets of Stable Ruble Exchange Rate». 15.01.2015, 
Expert.ru, http://expert.ru/2015/01/15/sekretyi-stabilnogo-kursa-rublya/ (in 
Russian) 
Blinov, Sergey (2015c) «Real Money and Economic Growth». MPRA Paper No. 
67461, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67461/ 
 
Lien, Kathy (2013) «Day Trading the Currency Market» (M. Alpina Publisher, 2013) 
(in Russian). English Edition: Day Trading the Currency Market: Technical and 
Fundamental Strategies To Profit from Market Swings (Wiley Trading, 2008) 
Lynch, Peter (2011) «One Up on Wall Street: How to Use What You Already Know 
to Make Money in the Market» (М. Alpina Publisher, 2011) (in Russian). English 
Edition: One Up On Wall Street: How To Use What You Already Know To Make 
Money In The Market (Simon & Schuster, 2000) 
 
Overchenko, Mikhail (2013) «Nobel Prize in Economics Was Awarded for Analysis 
of Prices for Assets», website of the «Vedomosti» newspaper, 14.10.2013, 
19 
 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2013/10/14/nobelevskuyu-premiyu-
po-ekonomike-prisudili-za-poluchil  (in Russian) 
Chirkova, Elena (2010) «Anatomy of Financial Bubble». (М. Case Publishers, 2010) 
(in Russian) 
Shiller, Robert (2013) «Eternal Bubbles», the «Vedomosti» newspaper No.3391 
dated 22.07.2013. 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2013/07/22/vechnye-puzyri  (in 
Russian) 
